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Studies making use of (de)politicisation have flourished as governments have embraced technocratic 
and delegated forms of governance. Yet this increase in use is not always matched by conceptual 
or analytical refinement. Nor has scholarship generally travelled into empirical terrain beyond 
economic and monetary policy, nor assessed whether politicising and depoliticising processes 
could occur simultaneously. It is within this intellectual context that we make a novel contribution 
by focusing on the (de)politicising discourses, processes and outcomes within policy surrounding 
assisted reproductive technologies. We reveal a pattern of partial repoliticisation that raises 
questions about the relationship between governance, technology, society and state.
key words depoliticisation • governance • HFE Act • Father’s Clause
(De)politicisation and the Father’s Clause parliamentary debates
The concepts of politicisation and depoliticisation are used within this article to 
provide a lens through which to analyse the social and political consequences of 
the development of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and, specifically, the 
introduction of the Father’s Clause (henceforth the Clause) and its subsequent removal 
in the 1990 and 2008 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Acts passed in the 
UK Parliament. The Clause referred to the ‘child’s need for a father’ when considering 
whether to provide women with in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and acted as a lightning 
rod for broader ideological clashes over the family, sexuality, children’s welfare and 
parenthood. 
Despite the legislation being a formal governmental politicisation (in that ARTs are 
taken as a specific field of state intervention), we argue that the Clause’s insertion and 
related debates were depoliticising in that they maintained discursive sedimentation 
and the restriction of agency and deliberation. Yet, the Clause’s removal is not a simple 
case of correction because depoliticising remainders exist within what can be seen as 
a formal repoliticising move. Its removal is partially politicising because it formally 
opens access, destabilises certain norms and recognises a plurality of family forms. 
article
SPECIAL ISSUE • Depoliticisation, governance and the state
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Yet, the potential for legislation in this area to repoliticise particular social relations 
is tempered by depoliticising processes which reduce the capacity for deliberation, 
contestation and, thus, place limitations upon human agency and collective choice. This 
is highlighted by the presence of pervasive gender essentialisms within the debates, 
and depoliticising assumptions concerning pro-natalism, kinship, access and control 
within the legislation which perpetuate the constitution of stable subject positions 
and place limits on reproductive choice. 
In making this argument, the article makes three main contributions to the (de)
politicisation and governance literatures. First, it offers a completely fresh empirical 
terrain through which to explore (de)politicisation and demonstrate how the concepts 
can be employed usefully beyond economic and monetary policy. Second, the article 
offers a deeper and historically situated analysis of (de)politicising tendencies and 
the interplay of sociopolitical developments, sensitivities and practices on discourses, 
processes and outcomes in different political realms. A focus on public policy 
construction within the governmental arena can help us to reveal broader (de)
politicising processes that emerge from social relations, technological developments 
and expectations related to human reproduction and that impact upon formal political 
outcomes. Further, a lens of (de)politicisation allows us to analyse the reciprocal 
impacts of these parliamentary proceedings on such narratives, institutions and 
technologies and, thus, the possibilities for reproductive choice and agency. Third and 
most significantly, through an analysis of the Clause and the legislative and regulatory 
outcomes, the article reveals how politicisation and depoliticisation should not be 
viewed solely and simply as opposing forces, as much of the literature does, but 
rather as operating, at least sometimes, as parallel and simultaneous socioeconomic 
trends within and between governmental, public and private realms. We suggest 
that highlighting these tensions and paradoxes within and between the content and 
context of politics is important. Using such distinctions demonstrates further the 
value and utility of (de)politicisation to sensitising governance researchers to the flows 
and eddies of state-societal relations and the intricacies of contemporary patterns of 
policy making, governance and democracy.
Close readings of parliamentary debates concerning the Clause and the 1990 and 
2008 HFE Acts provide the substance of this article. Transcripts of debates were 
obtained from Hansard and coded using qualitative analysis software, NVivo. Analysis 
occurred in two stages. First, coding was undertaken to distinguish the basic themes 
of debate surrounding the Clause’s insertion and removal. Although parliamentarians 
drew upon public deliberation of IVF, the parliamentary debates had their own 
dynamic with contributions being articulated around four main themes: the family; 
rights and interests; purposes/consequences of legislation; and the role of the state. 
Second, more in-depth analysis was conducted in order to identify the different kinds 
and patterns of argument occurring within each theme (for example, distinguishing 
the role of the state in preventing discrimination from its role in protecting children) 
which then allowed us to offer an analysis of the (de)politicising discourses, processes 
and (legislative) outcomes operating within the parliamentary debates and juridical 
regulation of IVF.
The article contains five sections. First, we situate our approach within the (de)
politicisation spectrum. Second, we provide an overview of the politics of ARTs 
and the place of the Clause within this politics. We then analyse the parliamentary 
debates on both the Clause’s insertion and removal in the third and fourth sections 
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respectively. In the conclusion, we summarise our argument and reflect upon the 
potential contribution to governance research of this processual yet differentiated 
approach to (de)politicisation. 
The spectrum of (de)politicisation
As Wood and Flinders (2014: 151–70) demonstrate, types of (de)politicisation can be 
categorised into one of three broad and overlapping ‘faces’ – discursive, societal and 
governmental – which broadly map on to Hay’s three realms of politicisation (with 
depoliticisation operating in a reverse order):
• Politicisation 1: Promotion from the realm of necessity to the private sphere
• Politicisation 2: Promotion from the private to the public sphere
• Politicisation 3: Promotion from the public to the governmental sphere (Hay, 
2007, 79–80)
Discursive depoliticisation focuses on ideas and language. It ‘offers a de-centred 
approach that cuts across conventional boundaries…and instead recognises the manner 
in which any [fatalistic] speech-act… is itself a powerful tool of depolitisation’ (Wood 
and Flinders, 2014: 161). Societal depoliticisation can be conceived as ‘the process 
by which the social deliberation surrounding a political issue gradually erodes to the 
extent that… the existence of choices concerning that issue are no longer debated’ 
(Harder (1996) cited in Wood and Flinders, 2014: 159). Depoliticisation research in 
British politics and public policy (for example, Burnham, 2001; Buller and Flinders, 
2005; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Kettell, 2008) has tended to focus mainly on the 
governmental face or Depoliticisation 3 in terms of economic and monetary policy. 
In this work, depoliticisation is examined as a governing strategy or statecraft which 
involves the appearance of a transfer or reduction of control and responsibility 
(although significant control is still maintained and often enhanced in the process) 
and/or as a concept which refers to the central role such processes have played in 
forms of technocratic governance and/or economic management guiding neoliberal 
capitalist reproduction. This research is very important in recognising, explaining and 
critiquing governing strategies under neoliberalism. However, there is a limitation in 
conceptualising depoliticisation exclusively as a function of government and the state 
and solely in terms of ‘placing at one remove’ and ‘managing market expectations’ 
(Burnham, 2001). The feminist claim that the ‘personal is political’ suggests that scholars 
concerned with (de)politicisation can and, perhaps, should widen their gaze both 
to political spaces beyond the formal governmental arena and to empirical terrains 
beyond economic and monetary policy. This would mean loosening the concept of 
(de)politicisation from the state and recognising that there are other processes of (de)
politicisation beyond modes of statecraft.
We wish to argue that an expansive and differentiated conceptualisation of (de)
politicisation is helpful in examining fully the interplay between policy, politics and 
the polity, in drawing attention to both the content and context of (de)politicisation 
and, consequently, in exposing relations of power and political agency within the 
domestic, personal and private spheres. Here, the political is conceptualised as the 
realm of contingency, such that the existence of politics relies on the possibility or 
hope of deliberation, contestation, change and, consequently, on human capacities 
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for agency (Gamble, 2000; Hay, 2007; Jenkins, 2011). This expansive definition serves 
to delineate the political from the realm of fate and necessity and, concurrently, 
raises questions both about how political capacities can be increased or reduced 
and about the changing boundaries within the political. Consequently, in the most 
general terms, ‘to politicise’ is to expose and contest what is taken for granted, or 
perceived to be necessary, permanent, invariable, essential and morally or politically 
obligatory within particular social relations; ‘to depoliticise’ is to externalise, to form 
necessities, permanence, immobility and closure, and conceal, negate or remove 
contingency and contestation within particular social relations (Jenkins, 2011, 159–60). 
Both are political acts: politicisation helps to denaturalise, to reveal and contribute 
towards contingency, openness and autonomy; depoliticisation generates discursive 
sedimentation; the restriction, removal or suppression of our capacities for autonomy, 
as well as the preservation of particular (fatalistic) strategies or forces. At a content 
level, the process of depoliticisation is akin to the sedimentation or decontestation 
of ideology (Howarth et al, 2000). Here, political discourses that shape our worlds 
and our understandings of them reach a degree of stability or ‘sedimentation’ such 
that the contestable conditions of their constitution are no longer socially recognised 
(Norval, 2000, 328). This process of naturalising sedimentation is an aspect of political 
conduct which can take different forms, such as subject or identity formation, 
myth-making, production of ‘moral panics’ or, simply, decision making that invokes 
ideological concepts.
This approach sensitises us to the content of (de)politicisation – the type of choice 
and contestation that is being invited or foreclosed, and from and for whom. However, 
it is also important to examine the means through which things can become (de)
politicised (Flinders and Buller, 2006) both within and between different political 
contexts. This is achieved through conserving the idea of different (real and imagined) 
spaces within the non-political and political terrain and differentiating between 
the private (that is, the domestic and personal), public and governmental spheres 
(Hay, 2007, 78–87). Although these distinctions are permeable and can, of course, 
be ambiguous, controversial and contested, the sphere in which a (de)politicising 
process occurs is frequently significant in terms of the scope, significance and even 
the content of that process (as demonstrated below). 
Retaining a focus on context within an expansive definition of the political allows 
for the provision of political cartographies, the examination of changing topographies 
and transgressed boundaries, the investigation of the movement of issues, people, 
processes and so on between different (permeable and non-static) arenas (Coole, 2000), 
an examination of both the ways in which different spheres have been normatively 
interpreted, and the political nature of spaces which, traditionally, have been viewed 
as either less or non-political. Moreover, it allows for the identification of both 
politicising and depoliticising processes within the same moment and same political 
space in that depoliticising content can be found within contextual politicising shifts 
and vice versa. So, as shown below in detail, the UK Parliament intervened in the 
area of reproductive technologies in the 1990 HFE Act which entails governmental 
politicisation (Hay’s Politicisation 1). This was both responsive to and generative of 
societal deliberation and a degree of contestation (Hay’s Politicisation 2), but the Act 
contained depoliticisation in the form of discursive sedimentation (Hay’s Depoliticisation 
1) as it attempted to moralise, normalise and limit provision to particular (nuclear) 
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families. In this way, the approach advocated here seeks to examine all three ‘faces’ of 
(de)politicisation identified by Wood and Flinders (2014) and their interplay.
The politics of human reproduction and arts
Feminists and others have long recognised that human reproduction is political and 
imbued with power relations. Louise Brown’s birth in 1978 marked an important 
moment in this politics. Her existence as the first ‘test tube baby’ confirmed the 
viability of IVF as a means of conception and brought hope to those with fertility 
problems. Concurrently, IVF’s development heralded a turning point in the ability of 
humans to control and direct human reproduction through scientific and technical 
intervention and, thus, in the politics of human reproduction. Hay argues that ‘in 
increasing the capacity for human agency or interference… in matters previously 
the preserve of nature, the development of modern science has proved politicising’ 
(2007, 81). This is not to suggest naively that IVF has spectacularly shifted human 
reproduction per se from the realm of fate to that of politics. The biological process 
of reproduction has never been untouched by social intervention (for example, 
surrogacy has existed for almost as long as recorded human history (Anleu, 1992)). 
Yet, the development of IVF is exceptional in its successful creation of an embryo 
outside the female body without the privacy of the sex act; it allows for divisions 
between the roles of biological and social parenthood that were ‘impossible before the 
appearance of these techniques’ (Caplan, 1990, 101). Louise Brown’s birth represents 
both the creation of new life and unprecedented political and conceptive possibilities. 
As Purdy argues, IVF ‘means that the infertile do not have to accept their fate: there is 
always another procedure to try’ (1998, 167). Thus, the development of ARTs crosses a 
significant threshold: there is a shift from the non-political realm of necessity towards 
the political realm of contingency and agency, as well as a significant alteration in 
the institution of the family through the production of new social and kin relations. 
Thus, in relation to Politicisation 1 with its emphasis on extending agency and 
choice, the development of ARTs came to politicise human reproduction in two 
key ways which are non-governmental at base: it accomplished a radical material 
change in the management of reproduction through technical intervention; and it 
had the potential not only to impact upon the institutional form of the family but 
also destabilise decontested assumptions concerning the ‘naturalness’ of the hetero-
nuclear family by exposing, as well as introducing, the contingency operating within 
this institution. So, for example, new possibilities for identification (that is, biological 
mother; second parent, male role model, and so on) have been opened up. 
Further, in relation to Politicisation 2, Louise Brown’s birth engendered impassioned 
public debate and deliberation about the choices, hopes, fears, expectations, dangers 
and prohibitions created by IVF. Religious organisations, feminists, patient and support 
groups, healthcare professionals, scientists, ethicists and philosophers, as well as the 
populace, immediately began to deliberate on the moral, ethical, social and practical 
implications. The public debate was often polarised and perhaps inevitably centred 
on the apparent benefits and dangers of IVF, employing the general rhetoric of what 
Mulkay (1993; 1996) entitles ‘hope and fear’ (see also Kettell, 2010) and opening up 
reflection on the embryo’s status, related technology, the meaning of parenthood, 
reproductive control, the health and welfare of prospective mothers and unborn 
children, and scarcity and access of provision.
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These non-governmental politicisations were followed by further, more formal 
politicising processes associated with the development of public policy, regulation 
and legislation. Franklin argues, ‘the birth of Louise Brown brought into being more 
than a child; it created a ‘legislative vacuum’ that needed to be filled’ (1993, 97) 
and, therefore, the theming of the issue as appropriate for state action. Yet, in part 
due to IVF’s controversy and the lack of relevant extant law, there was a time lag 
between the beginnings of this formal politicisation and the legislative outcome and 
subsequent juridical regulation – the culmination of Politicisation 3. The beginning of 
this politicising shift from the public to the governmental realm occurred with the 
commission of the Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
chaired by Mary Warnock, in July 1982. The committee delivered its report in 1984 
with it forming the basis of the 1990 Act and the establishment of an arm’s-length 
regulator, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in 1991 (for 
other relevant Parliamentary activity during this period see Franklin 1993, 98). 
In Parliament and to the surprise of Warnock and others, it was the issue of embryo 
research which came to dominate parliamentary debates on the HFE Act (Franklin, 
1993). However, another prominent element of the debate surrounded the welfare 
of the child and, in particular, the need for a father. The draft bill stated:
• 13(5): A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account 
has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the 
treatment, and of any other child who may be affected by the birth...
• 25(2): The guidance given by the code shall include guidance for those providing 
treatment services about the account to be taken of the welfare of children who 
may be born as a result of treatment services.
However, after two amendments were introduced successfully (on a vote of 226 to 
174) by the Conservative MP, David Wilshire, the words ‘including the need of that 
child for a father’ were inserted in brackets after ‘treatment’ in 13(5) and the words 
‘including a child’s need for a father’ were parenthetically inserted after ‘services’ in 
25(2). These amendments made explicit what was contained within the Warnock 
report (that is, that an IVF child would and should have both mother and father).
In 2004, parliamentarians and others felt the need to review the law and regulation 
surrounding human reproductive technologies to ensure that the law remained 
‘effective and fit for purpose’ (Department of Health, 2005). Under the headings 
of ‘Welfare of the child’ and ‘Status and legal parenthood’ and through reference to 
notions of comprehensiveness, discrimination, the changing nature of family structures 
and openness to access, the review made explicit the need to consider the necessity of 
the Father’s Clause in subsequent public consultation (see Annex B, Department of 
Health, 2005, and Recommendation 21, House of Commons Science and Technology 
Select Committee, 2005). In the 2007 Draft Bill, the two references to the child’s 
need for a father were removed. A number of amendments were tabled proposing 
the re-introduction of explicit reference to the need for a father (and mother) but 
these were rejected in favour of another amendment that replaced ‘the need for a 
father’ with ‘the need for supportive parenting’ and the Bill went on to receive its 
Royal Assent in November 2008. 
The Clause’s removal and its replacement with the phrase ‘the need for supportive 
parenting’ means that IVF has now been fully and formally opened up to single 
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women and same-sex couples. Perhaps predictably, this change drew strong reactions 
and was both hailed as progressive and condemned as harmful and absurd. Evan 
Harris, then a Liberal Democrat MP, said the Clause ‘was unjustifiable, discriminatory 
and vindictive… so good riddance’, while Josephine Quintavalle, of Comment on 
Reproductive Ethics, criticised the removal as a ‘dreadful statement to make about the 
role of men. Fatherhood is much more than the donation of sperm’ (BBC, 2006). In 
either interpretation, the Clause’s removal was seen as transformative. This contrasts 
with the academic literature (for example, Fox, 2009; Gamble, 2009; McCandless and 
Sheldon, 2010), which views the 2008 Act as a ‘missed opportunity’ and the Clause’s 
removal as a relatively minor amendment that makes little difference in terms of 
clinical guidance and in keeping with the original legislation.
Yet, as McCandless and Sheldon (2010) themselves suggest, parliamentary debates 
on the Clause’s introduction and removal acted as lightning rods for underlying 
ideological clashes on the family, rights and equality that derive from (changing) 
social perspectives. It is partly in this sense that the Clause makes such an excellent 
case to demonstrate the utility of approaching public policy through the lens of (de)
politicisation, in that it allows us to depart from both public and prevailing academic 
interpretations. We see its removal as neither ‘transformative’, nor ‘minor’. Rather, 
as demonstrated below, the Clause’s introduction, despite being contained within 
a formal politicising shift, is best viewed as a depoliticising, moralising response to 
IVF’s development and its removal should be viewed as partial repoliticisation with 
depoliticising remainders. 
Parliamentary debates on the introduction of the Father’s Clause, 
1984–90
In the debates surrounding the Clause’s introduction, discussions of the family, rights 
and interests, and the purposes and consequences of legislation were framed, overall, 
by conservative social and moral narratives on the traditional family form, in part 
due to the Conservative parliamentary majority. For example, the Lord Chancellor 
believed that the legislation should not detract from the stability of the family, as ‘the 
health of the family is largely at the heart of the continuing health of our society’ 
(HL 6-3-1990 col.1105). Within this overarching emphasis on the traditional family, 
the Clause’s introduction is thus best conceptualised ‘in terms of a refusal of single 
motherhood and a desire to link women to men’ (McCandless and Sheldon, 2010, 
205). This attempted entrenchment of the traditional nuclear family is a high-profile 
and formal depoliticising reaction to the politicisation of the family form that IVF 
engendered. At a time when single parenthood and the decline of marriage often 
provoked moral panic, the creation of a child in vitro extended further the possibility 
of parenthood, not only to infertile married couples but also to single, cohabiting 
and homosexual people. This was something ‘deplorable’ to many, especially those 
of a conservative and/or religious disposition, and was something that needed to be 
prevented, or at least limited. The restriction of IVF access to particular groups (and, 
thus, the restriction of human agency) was achieved in a legal sense through the 
introduction of the Clause, which itself was a dilution of Lady Saltoun’s narrowly 
unsuccessful amendment to criminalise the treatment of unmarried women (Gamble, 
2009). The attempt to limit IVF was also achieved in a linguistic sense, through 
the articulation and perpetuation of depoliticising narratives in the debates. Such 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
at
h
IP
 : 
16
5.
12
0.
75
.2
04
 O
n:
 F
ri,
 0
3 
Ju
l 2
01
5 
08
:5
3:
59
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
Stephen Bates et al
250
arguments were often premised on a Christian morality, which utilised the language 
of what was ‘God-given’, ‘natural’, ‘normal’, ‘common-sense’ and in line with ‘the 
witness of history’. This moralising depoliticisation attempted to define issues as either 
inside or outside day-to-day political debate, both imposing a ‘rational’ normative 
foundation and, thereby, reducing and attempting to conceal possible choices.
These linguistic devices acted as extra deliberative defences that had to be breached 
before the substance of the argument surrounding IVF and its impact on the family 
and society could be addressed. The message is fatalistic: humans should not interfere 
with the natural family form, even if scientifically possible. Therefore, restrictions 
should be imposed to maintain the status quo and protect both the child’s welfare 
and, more broadly, the health of society. Thus, Lord Denning argued that artificial 
insemination should be allowed ‘only in those circumstances to a married couple 
with a stable union with every likelihood of the child being brought up properly’ (HL 
15-1-1988 col.1478). To open up access to ARTs to people not part of a traditional 
family would, in Ann Winterton’s words, be to ‘upset the natural order of things’, 
‘threaten the bonds of the conventional family unit’, and not be in ‘the best interests 
of the child’ (HC 23-11-1984 col.577). Allowing access to other types of ‘abnormal’ 
families was ‘deplorable’. This oft-made line of argument is encapsulated by David 
Wilshire’s contribution:
When speaking of the family in this context, we are seeking to speak up 
for the traditional values and standards of society that have stood us in good 
stead for a long time… That value and standard is deeply embedded in our 
culture…. It is a tried and tested way of giving a child the best possible 
start in… life. We tinker with that social unit at our peril. (HC 20-6-1990 
col.1023)
The emotive and ‘common sense’ linkage of the traditional family to the child’s 
welfare is particularly depoliticising in that alternatives appear automatically as non-
viable and immoral. Moral and political boundaries are preserved and the scope of 
political choice is limited by attempts to cover over or reject the contingent nature 
of family forms and, indeed, attempts to remove the family from political debate. The 
discursive power of these limitations can perhaps be seen in that, when objections to 
this line of argument were raised, it was only in terms of opening access to unmarried 
heterosexual couples and, occasionally, single women but not to homosexuals, even 
though the Warnock Report mentioned the potential of IVF to allow same-sex 
couples and single men to become parents.
The linkages made between the traditional family and the child’s welfare meant that 
discussions centred on the child’s interests, rather than the interests and rights of other 
groups and individuals. This emphasis on the child was ultimately premised on a form 
of gender essentialism – the purported different, complementary and fundamental 
familial roles played by men and women and the production of particular stable 
subjects. For example, Renée Short referred to the necessity of ‘a stable relationship 
with a father and a mother’ because ‘the establishment of the gender role is important 
[for the child]’ (HC 23-11-1984 col.557). These gender roles tended to go along 
traditional lines with parliamentarians often – sometimes solely – drawing attention 
to the father’s financial contribution in providing a stable home. Thus, the Clause’s 
introduction can be viewed as a means of protecting three related, preponderating 
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and depoliticising perspectives disrupted by IVF’s development: the association of 
men and women with distinct modes of parenting such as providing and caring 
respectively; that these gendered differences were seen to be a direct reflection of 
biological differences; and that heterosexual parents and heterosexuality in general 
were the desired standard because of the purported complementary roles of the two 
distinct genders. The protection and perpetuation of these views within the legislation 
operates as an attempt to restrict agency, both in terms of access to IVF for certain 
families, and in terms of constraining the possibility of approaching parenthood in a 
way that differs from traditional normalising traits.
Reflecting the emphasis on the child’s interests, discussions of rights did not 
emerge until debates in 1990 (with the exception of the child’s right to know their 
heritage and father). A key discussion here was whether childbearing is a right. In 
explaining why he believed ARTs should be restricted to married couples, David 
Blunkett contended:
People have an absolute right to be themselves, to reject contact with men 
or to shun any physical contact with them. That is their choice. But that is 
not the same as accepting that there is some automatic or inalienable right 
to child bearing. Child bearing is not a right. It is part of the unfathomable 
life force. (HC 20-6-1990 col.1023)
In speaking of the ‘unfathomable life force’, Blunkett can be seen as ignoring or even 
rejecting the degree to which IVF presents new choices and shifts childbearing from 
the realm of fate towards the realm of human agency and ‘fathomability’. Once again, 
this reinforces the fatalistic tone of much debate and the moral anxiety surrounding 
the development of ARTs. In contrast, the extension of reproductive possibilities 
caused by IVF’s development was more often recognised by those who argued against 
the Clause and in terms that were often a forerunner of debates about its removal in 
the 2000s; for example, Jo Richardson’s argument that the Clause would be rendered 
unworkable due to the ‘overwhelming wish’ of many women, whether single, divorced 
or separated, to have a baby (HC 20-6-1990 col.1028).
Parliamentary debates on the removal of the Father’s Clause, 
2007–08
In contrast to the parliamentary debates that led to the Clause’s introduction in which 
conservative arguments on the benefits of the traditional family were to the fore, 
discussions of the Clause after the millennium were framed largely by a liberal emphasis 
on rights and non-discrimination. In this sense, a shift in prominence can be identified 
between a paternalistic view of the state as protector of citizens to a liberal view of 
the state as guarantor of citizens’ freedom and equality which was perhaps reflective 
of the New Labour majority. This shift represents a politicisation of reproduction, and 
IVF in particular, in the sense of increasing openness and autonomy such that things, 
specifically family forms, become ‘the subject of deliberation, decision making and 
human agency where previously they were not’ (Hay, 2007, 81).
The Clause’s removal formally opens up equal capacity to become parents to more 
groups and involves recognition of the (value of) plurality of family forms. Yet, the 
Clause’s removal should not be viewed in any other way than a partial and limited 
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repoliticisation, in that neither the amended 2008 HFE Act, nor the accompanying 
parliamentary debates, offer the possibility of challenging other social patterns and 
restrictive, sedimented understandings of reproduction. It would be mistaken to present 
the Clause’s removal as a simple case of correcting the depoliticising tendencies of 
previous legislation. 
Furthermore, unlike debates in the 1980s and 1990s in which liberal arguments 
were marginal (despite the relative closeness of the vote), (modified) conservative 
arguments maintained a prominent, although not dominant, position. Nonetheless, 
these conservative lines of argument tended to be characterised by a certain 
defensiveness that was not present in earlier debates (for example, Patrick Cormack 
(HC 20-5-2008 col.206-207); the Earl of Listowel (HL 10-12-2007 col.58)). This is 
perhaps indicative of an attempt to operate within the different political composition 
of Parliament, an alternative ideological, legal and linguistic frame and a society in 
which attitudes concerning sexuality had altered. 
Strong and relatively uncontested linkages in debates in the 1980s and 1990 between 
the traditional family and the child’s welfare had hindered the possibility of considering 
the rights and interests of other groups. This altered in debates concerning the Clause 
removal, both because of intervening changes in social attitudes concerning the merits 
of alternative family forms, and because of the ability of reformers to articulate their 
belief that the child’s welfare could be assured through alternative family forms. This 
was achieved primarily through a focus on scientific and anecdotal evidence that either 
had not yet been undertaken, or was previously treated dismissively (for example, see 
Dari Taylor, HC 20-5-2008 col.194). One major source was Golombok’s and others’ 
research (1999; 2001) which claimed that there were signs that children brought up 
by lesbian couples were better parented. This highlighting of the evidential basis of 
arguments can be contrasted with the value claims underpinning earlier discussions. 
The insistence on considering the available evidence enabled reformers to shape the 
contours of debate around the quality of parenting, rather than the sex of prospective 
parents, and couch the interests of both child and parent in terms of rights to which 
their opponents had to respond. Consequently, one of the focuses of debate was the 
fairness of the Clause, rather than, as the Clause’s supporters wanted, fatherhood’s 
value (see Evan Harris, HC 20-5-2008 col.203).
Reformers’ arguments were informed by a belief that the Clause violated the 
rights of certain potential parents and discriminated against particular groups. For 
example, Baroness Barker suggested that all that was being asked for was ‘equality 
of consideration’ (HL 10-12-2007 col. 50) and Emily Thornberry stated that the 
Clause was ‘discriminatory and unfair’ towards single women and lesbian couples 
(HC 12-5-2008 col. 1123). The success of this shift of emphasis allowed an instance 
of Politicisation 3: equality of access to IVF was politicised, both in terms of it being 
an issue subject to parliamentary deliberation, and in terms of the legislative outcome 
as part of a broader programme of formally prohibiting discrimination.
As well as breaking with the previous near-consensus that access to IVF should be 
restricted, the later debates brought into question judgments on particular family forms 
as normal, natural and normatively desirable. This destabilisation and denaturalisation 
represent a more formal recognition within the governmental arena of the (value 
of the) plurality of family forms. This recognition can be viewed as politicising to 
the extent that alternatives are taken to be viable and a clear commonsensical link 
is no longer seen to flow necessarily from someone’s sexuality and the status of 
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their relationship to their ability to parent. Homosexual partners and single women 
tended to be no longer dismissed automatically as suitable parents or as a threat to the 
institution of the family (and society). Thus, the debates were less essentialised, at least 
in terms of traits purportedly related to one’s sexuality. So when parliamentarians did 
refer to the vital role of the nuclear family both in society and in raising a child in 
terms of what was ‘designed by nature’ (Geraldine Smith, HC 12-5-2008 col.1097; 
see also Iris Robinson, HC 12-5-2008 col.1125), they were immediately challenged 
in a way which was not seen in previous debates. Reformers accused the Clause’s 
advocates of offensiveness, exclusivity and of using common sense and particular 
‘evidence’ as a cover for prejudice (Sandra Osborne and Emily Thornberry, HC 20-
5-2008 col.176-178; Chris Bryant, HC 20-5-2008 co.205).
The language of pro-Clause parliamentarians did alter to incorporate references 
to rights, evidence, and positive value judgments on single and same-sex parents, but 
rather than claiming that full access would threaten the traditional family and openly 
recommending marriage, the Clause’s advocates contended that its removal would: 
lead to a violation of children’s rights (Baroness O’Cathain, HL 10-12-2007 col.26); 
lead to an increase in social problems deemed to be connected to unstable, fatherless 
families (Geraldine Smith, HC 12-5-2008 col.1097); and threaten fatherhood and 
men (Lord Alton, HL 10-12-2007 col.45). The implication was that these negative 
outcomes, couched emotively in terms of depriving the child and, indeed, the 
language of gender equality and anti-discrimination (for example, Lord Patten, HL 
21-1-2008 col.83-84), would be partially avoided if IVF provision were limited to 
married couples or stable heterosexual partnerships. This change in terminology and 
discursive markers can then perhaps be seen as rebranding and altering the emphasis 
of depoliticising arguments concerning restricted access which had not fundamentally 
changed. However, the continuing presence of depoliticising arguments concerning 
‘natural’ family forms within the parliamentary debates is not, in itself, depoliticising. 
Indeed, the silencing of these kinds of arguments would be a depoliticising move 
itself, as one aspect of politicisation concerns maintaining deliberation, the possibility 
of disagreement and contestation (Honig, 1993). 
While issues of access and alternative family forms were repoliticised within both 
debates and the resulting legislation, the Clause’s removal is a partial politicisation for 
at least two reasons: first, different forms of gender essentialism remained prominent 
and unchallenged within debates (although not carried formally into the wording of 
the legislation itself); second, there was an absence of challenges to various sedimented 
assumptions concerning pro-natalism, access, choice, kinship and control in relation 
to human reproduction. 
Turning to the former first, a residual depoliticising presence of gender 
essentialism pervaded arguments on both sides, despite the questioning of the idea 
that homosexuality was incompatible with good parenting. This questioning and 
the consequent disruption of the ideal family did lead to references to ‘the male 
role model’, rather than solely ‘the father’ (for example, Andrew Lansley, HC 12-5-
2008 col.1078-9) but, overall, the idea that men and women play distinct, necessary, 
but complementary roles in family life was rarely contested. Although Baroness 
Finlay came close to questioning whether parental duties and children’s needs were 
necessarily guaranteed by ‘biological definitions’ (HL 10-12-2007 col.57), gendered 
distinctions were generally represented as ‘facts of life’ – again, concealing and 
forgetting the contingency of gendered norms – and the view that experiencing 
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the interactions of both men and women would necessarily enhance the child’s life 
was portrayed as commonsensical (for example, Baroness Deech, HL 10-12-2007 
col.23-4; Baroness Williams, HL 21-1-2008 col.73; Geraldine Smith, HC 20-5-2008 
col.177). As feminists have contended, the view that men and women have distinct 
characteristics is depoliticising because it is inaccurate, harmful, constraining and, 
ultimately restricts agency. It is a harmful view because those who do not conform to 
accepted characteristics are seen as abnormal and, if left unchallenged, often legitimises 
unequal treatment through the valuation of particular gendered characteristics 
above others (Steans, 2006, 7–10). It constrains by homogenising and entrenching 
gendered behaviour. For example, Baroness Deech perpetuated gendered expectations 
concerning mothers as ‘nurturers’ when she spoke of the fact that the need for a 
mother was already ‘implicit in the need to consider the welfare of the child’ (HL 
10-12-2007 col. 22). Yet, while parliamentary contributions may be imbued with 
gender essentialism, the resulting legislation does not make gender-explicit claims 
about parenthood. Therefore, the legislative outcome, at least, does not continue to 
entrench depoliticising assumptions about mother- and fatherhood and could open 
up space for a plurality of gender characteristics.
The second reason why the Clause’s removal should not be interpreted as entirely 
politicising is the absence of open deliberation upon, and interrogation of, various 
sedimented assumptions concerning parenthood, such as pro-natalism, kinship, choice 
and control. Perhaps the most noticeable absence was any challenge to pro-natalist 
ideas. Pro-natalism – the view that desiring children is natural for women and that 
motherhood is female destiny – has been extensively challenged within feminist 
literatures that suggest that the desire for genetically related children is socially 
conditioned (Rich, 1977; Oakley, 1980; Stanworth, 1987; Rowland, 1992; Raymond, 
1993). Furthermore, this literature highlights the way in which social pressure and 
stigma is exerted on the childless, and in which the availability of IVF perpetuates 
and reinforces pro-natalism, as infertility becomes viewed as pathological (Ulrich and 
Weatherall, 2000). The parliamentary debates on the Clause’s removal are underpinned 
overwhelmingly by positive valuations of IVF and the opportunity it provides for 
biological parenthood. This has several ramifications. First, the debates ignored possible 
negative consequences of IVF provision. IVF was assumed to provide a safe and entirely 
positive solution to the otherwise disrupted ‘normal’ progression of life (Mulkay, 
1993, 725). Indeed, parliamentarians did not consider the technology’s relatively 
low success rates, its high financial costs (beyond cycles provided on the NHS), and 
the potentially serious health risks (to child and mother), widely acknowledged in 
feminist literatures and campaigns (Klein, 1989; Shildrick, 1997; Throsby and Gill, 
2004; www.handsoffourovaries.com). Such literature suggests that privately pursuing 
IVF is never a neutral decision and stresses the difficulty of achieving both informed 
choices about parenthood and positive outcomes.
Second, the formal extension of IVF to more people (that is, single women and 
same-sex couples), and the negotiations over kinship that this entailed, reinforces 
the symbolic importance of the genetic identity of the child that is characteristic of 
Euro-American cultures (Franklin, 1993). In this way, the greater availability of IVF 
may discourage and undermine both other ways of becoming a parent (for example, 
adoption), and the role of the wider community in childrearing and children’s welfare 
(although see Baronesses Howarth (HL 10-12-2007 col. 55), and Butler-Sloss (HL 
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10-12-2007 col. 67)). There was very little recognition of the cultural importance of 
bloodlines and genetic relations and how IVF reinforces this culture. 
The final absence from the debates on the Clause’s removal concerns those groups 
in society who still have limited or no access to IVF (for example, the poor). If one 
returns to the Warnock Report, what is conspicuous by its absence in parliamentary 
debates, especially given its controversial nature, is any reference to the possibility 
of single men becoming parents through IVF (in combination with surrogacy 
arrangements). The Warnock Report states:
In the same way that a single woman may believe she has a right to 
motherhood, so a single man may feel he has a right to fatherhood… 
[W]e were told of a group of single, mainly homosexual men who were 
campaigning for the right to bring up a child. The primary aim at present is 
to obtain in practice equal rights in the adoption field, but they are also well 
aware of the potential of surrogacy for providing a single man with a child 
which is genetically his… It can be argued that as a matter of sex equality if 
single women are not totally barred from parenthood, then neither should 
single men be so barred. (1984, Para.2.10)
This absence is important in the context of the way in which IVF involves a shift 
from the realm of fate to the realm of contingency. The amended 2008 HFE Act 
still throws up the anomaly that single men are now the only group legally excluded 
from producing genetically related children. This fact was not referred to either in the 
consultation or the debates. The point here is not necessarily to advocate an extension 
of the law but to highlight how an instance of Politicisation 1 – the development 
of IVF – creates novel controversies, issues and possibilities that may be neglected 
and may remain depoliticised (or become re-depoliticised) at different times and in 
different political spaces (this repoliticisation may now be occurring with the case of 
the man who is making a legal bid to become the first single father using surrogacy 
arrangements (Daily Mail, 2012), which echoes the campaign mentioned in the 
Warnock Report).
Conclusion
The purposes of this article were threefold: first, to demonstrate the ability of (de)
politicisation research to enter new empirical terrain beyond economic and monetary 
policy; second, to offer an analysis of the (de)politicising tendencies within both the 
development of ARTs and, especially, subsequent parliamentary activity; and, in so 
doing, third, to illustrate to governance researchers the benefits of an approach to 
(de)politicisation, underpinned by a processual but differentiated conceptualisation of 
politics, that sensitises us to both the complex content and context of politics, their 
interplay and the resultant outcomes, tensions and paradoxes.
The development of IVF did not politicise reproduction in the sense that it became 
subject to social intervention for the first time, nor did it entirely remove fatalism 
from reproduction. However, it did politicise in the sense that it introduced (private) 
reproductive choices and contingencies that were not present previously and that 
led to a governmental response in the form of parliamentary debates and the 1990 
HFE Act. In this sense, the Father’s Clause, as part of the HFE Act, was a formal 
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politicisation to regulate and manage ARTs. Yet the Clause itself is also a depoliticising 
move to entrench the nuclear family and the position of marriage in society. Thus, 
a governmental politicisation had depoliticising (discursive and material) effects in 
terms of both placing ideological barriers around acceptable political debate, and 
constraining the choices and agency of particular groups of people by excluding 
them from IVF access. 
The Clause’s removal was hailed as transformative – whether positively or negatively 
– by campaigners and parliamentarians alike. It would be easy to present this legislative 
amendment as an entirely progressive victory in terms of opening up access to 
technologies for frequently disadvantaged and stigmatised groups and cementing 
a commitment to equality and plurality. Yet the Clause’s removal and attendant 
parliamentary debates take on a slightly different character when viewed through the 
lens of (de)politicisation. This lens highlights (changing) societal assumptions about 
human reproduction, gender, sexuality and the family as articulated within a formal 
governmental arena, and helps reveal remaining absences and silences. Thus, we have 
argued that the Clause’s removal is politicising in that it formally opens up access to 
single women and homosexual couples and, in so doing, does not discriminate against, 
or prescribe, particular family forms. Furthermore, the debates involved negotiations 
over kinship (for example, in discussions about ‘male role models’ rather than ‘fathers’, 
and the legal status of the second parent within same-sex couples) which somewhat 
disrupted the linkage of social to natural parenthood.
However, essentialist arguments remained prominent in the 2007–08 debates in 
terms of particular gendered traits being seen as facts of life (for example, the delivery 
of care and nurturing were tied exclusively to women). Furthermore, there were 
remaining silences concerning the cultural importance of pro-natalism, possible 
negative effects of the technologies, the perpetuation of geneticised kinship relations, 
as well as some enduring issues with access and choice among particular groups which 
meant that the same processes and legislative outcomes, while politicising for some 
actors, were depoliticising for others. 
Therefore, a (de)politicisation lens reveals more fully the scope and terrain of this 
aspect of the politics of human reproduction and demonstrates why the Clause’s 
removal is best viewed as only a partial repoliticisation. Moreover, understanding the 
development of technology – in this case ARTs – as a type of politicisation entails 
grasping how governments have to formally respond both to fundamental material 
changes – in this instance with regard to how humans are capable of managing both 
reproduction and family forms – and to subsequent public deliberation. In this sense, 
parliamentarians and governments draw upon and extend, rather than direct, strategies 
and processes of (de)politicisation operating within society.
As this summary of our argument shows, the approach taken to (de)politicisation 
within this article is somewhat different to most of the approaches within the extant 
governance, British politics and public policy literatures. Depoliticisation tends to be 
viewed within these literatures solely as a governing strategy or statecraft in which the 
appearance of removing responsibility (often in the direction of arm’s-length bodies) 
results in low levels of deliberation and agency but also high levels of governmental 
control. This emphasis on placing at one remove and the subsequent impact upon the 
content of politics is valuable for understanding contemporary patterns of governance. 
Yet, it is also important to remember, as demonstrated in this article, both that processes 
of (de)politicisation can also occur concurrently and within particular political and social 
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spaces, and that state-societal relations are intimately entangled in all arenas in the 
governing of particular elements of our lives.
Politicisation and depoliticisation should not be viewed solely and simply as opposing 
forces but also as parallel and simultaneous sociopolitical trends. Consequently, both 
the content and context of (de)politicisation matters; processes of (de/re)politicisation 
should be viewed in terms of the opening and foreclosing of deliberation, engagement 
and agency, as well as in terms of shifting boundaries. This then allows governance 
researchers to capture, analyse and, potentially, criticise the complex interplay of 
democratic processes and state interventions with societal, cultural, economic and 
technological developments. This additional focus upon parliamentary debates and 
legislative outcomes as themselves potentially (de)politicising makes possible the 
exploration of tensions between (de)politicisation as a (formal) context-shifting of 
responsibilities between realms and (de)politicisation as an (informal) content-shift 
in how an issue is viewed (that is, as ‘natural’, subject to human agency, in need 
of government intervention, and so on). By opening up patterns of governance, 
parliamentary debates and public policy to critical scrutiny through this particular 
lens of (de)politicisation, it is possible, first, to reveal the restrictive and potentially 
disempowering depoliticising remainders within formal politicising moves and vice 
versa and, second, to demonstrate the critical potential of academic work on (de)
politicisation by highlighting processes which hold us captive and, thus, potentially 
extending the possibilities for contestation and collective action.
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